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Two Views of Soul:
Aristotle and Descartes*
THEODORE TRACY, SJ.
In the fourth century B.C. Aristotle rejected the tripartite psychology
of Plato in favor of his own hylomorphic theory of the body-soul
relationship. In the seventeenth century a.d. Rene Descartes rejected
the prevailing Aristotelian psychology in favor of what he considered
a more scientific notion of body controlled by an immortal, spiritual
soul or mind. Comparisons between the Platonic and Aristotelian
views of soul, their similarities and differences, arc commonplace,
going back to the works of Aristotle himself. Comparisons between
the Aristotelian and Cartesian views are perhaps not so commonplace.
In this paper I should like to draw attention to a few of their
similarities and differences. I cannot claim to add anything new to
our knowledge of either Aristotle's or Descartes' views of soul. But
perhaps the juxtaposition of the two may highlight some interesting
features of both.
What first attracted my interest to a possible comparison was the
realization that, unlike Plato, both Aristotle and Descartes shared the
view that, first, there is but a single soul and, second, that this soul
operates principally through a single specific bodily organ. Given his
own understanding, I believe Descartes could agree totally with
Aristotle's statement that the soul's "essential nature cannot be
* This paper was originally presented at the University of South Carolina in April
1981' as a contribution to a symposium on "Soul and Mind in Ancient Philosophy,"
organized by Professor Rosamond Kent Sprague.
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corporeal; yet it is also clear that soul is present in a particular bodily
part, and this one of the parts having control over the rest":'
dfiXou 6ri ovx oihv r' tivai adua rffv ovtriau ocvrfiq, aW 5fi(t)c, Sri 7' iv tlvl tov
(TUifiaToq inrapxii^ nopiw (t>avtpbv, kcu iv tovtw tivi twv ixovruiv bvvafiiv eV roJq
nopioic,. {Parva Naturalia 467b 13- 16)
For Aristotle, as we know, that particular controlling organ is the
heart. In his treatise On Memory, for example, Aristotle declares that
in blooded animals, including man, "the source and control center
{otpxvY of both the sensitive and nutritive soul must be in the heart":
apayKT) Koi rrfc, ataQr]TiKr\c, kou rriq dpeirTLKfic, ^vxri<i ^v ry Kapb'ux rffv otpxw
etW. {PN 469a5-7)
Again, in the De Partibus Animalium, the heart is designated as the
control center of sense perception and emotional response: "For it
is in the front and center of the body that the heart is situated, in
which we say is the source and control center of life and of all motion
and sensation":
f; p.lv yap Kapbia iv roiq tp.irpoaQev koll ev neaui Ketrm, iv y Trjv apxw <t>citi^v
T^q ^(iirfc, Kot iraar^q Kivr^aedq, re koi aLcrdrjaeojq. {De Partibus Animalium
665all-13)
Later, Aristotle adds: "Moreover, the motions of pain and pleasure,
and generally of all sensation, plainly have their source in the heart,
and find in it their ultimate termination":
en 6' ai Kivr}(TeL<; rdv ifbeoiv Koi rdv XvinijpCiiv Koi Skuiq iraar^q aiadfjaeuq evrevdep
apxbfieuai (j>aiuovTai Koi irpbc, ravrrju irepaivovaai. (666al2-13)
In the De Anima, in a context emphasizing the bodily aspects of
psychic states, Aristotle specifies: "... We may regard anger or fear
' The following are the sources for the text of the Greek, French and Latin
passages quoted. From Aristotle: De Anima, edited with introduction and commentary
by Sir David Ross (Oxford 1961); Parva Naturalia, edited with introduction and
commentary by Sir David Ross (Oxford 1957); De Generatione Animalium {Generation
of Animals, with an English translation, by A. L. Peck [Cambridge, Mass. 1953]); De
Partibus Animalium {Parts of Animals, with an English translation, by A. L. Peck
[Cambridge, Mass. 1955]); De Motu Animalium, with translation, commentary, and
essays by Martha Craven Nussbaum (Princeton 1978). From Descartes: Oeuvres de
Descartes, publiees par Charles Adam et Paul Tannery (Paris 1899) (= A-T).
The translations from Aristotle are adapted from Ross, Peck and Nussbaum, and
in the case of the De Anima from R. D. Hicks, Aristotle: De Anima (Cambridge 1907).
The translations from Descartes are from The Philosophical Works ofDescartes, rendered
into English by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, 2 vols. (Cambridge 1967) (= H-R).
^ On the notion of 17 dpxv as "source and control center," see Metaphysics
1012b34-1013aI4.
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as such and such movements of the heart, and thinking (dLauoeiadai)
as such and such another movement of that organ. . . ."^
. . . oiov TO opyi^taOai rj (f>o0€ladai to tt^v Kapbuxv wSl KivetaOai, to 81 biavodadai
fj Ti TOiovTOv ujooq rj erepov ti. . . . (408b8-9).
Clearly, then, for Aristotle the psychic functions of sense perception,
consciousness of pleasure and pain, emotional response, initiation of
external movement, even thinking or reasoning (diauoeladai) are
centered in the heart, the control center of the human organism.
For Descartes, the soul is principally present in, and operates
through, the pineal gland, which he situates inside the cavity of the
brain. In his treatise On the Passions of the Soul, for example, describing
how soul and body act on one another, Descartes begins: "Let us
then conceive here that the soul has its principal seat {son siege
principal) in the little gland which exists in the middle of the brain"
("Concevons done icy que I'ame a son siege principal dans la petite
glande qui est au milieu du cerveau . . .", Passions, Art. XXIV; H-R
I, 347; A-T XI, 354). Again, he refers to the pineal as "the small
gland which is the main seat of the soul" (". . . la petite glande qui
est le principal siege de I'ame, . . ." ibid.) and maintains that "the soul
cannot have any other seat in all the body than this gland wherein
to exercise its functions immediately" (". . . I'ame ne pent avoir en
tout le corps aucun autre lieu que cette glande, ou elle exerce
immediatement ses fonctions, . . ." Passions, Art. XXXII; H-R I, 346;
A-T XI, 352).
A closer examination of the psychology of both Aristotle and
Descartes reveals, of course, that neither conceived the soul as locally
confined to a single organ, but united with the entire body. In the De
Aninia, you recall, Aristotle defines soul as "the first actuality of a
natural body furnished with organs:"
ej/reXexeia T? TrpcoTTj aic^iaTOc, <f)vatK0v opyauiKOV (412b5-6).
Then, after comparing the unity of soul and body to that of eyesight
and eye, he continues: "What has been said of the part must be
understood to apply to the whole living body; for as sensation of a
part of the body is to that part, so is sensation as a whole to the
whole sentient body as such":
del 8fi Xa^elv to (ttI nepovq e'<^' SKov tov ^uiPToq aCinaTOc,. avaXoyov yap ex«i
wq TO nepoq irpbc, to fiepoq, ovtojc, t; 5\ri aiad-qau; irpbq to SKov adfia to
oacevTLKbu, ^ TOIOVTOV. (412522-25; cf. 4 14a 14- 19)
Since the soul is the first actuality of a natural body furnished with
' Oxford translation, and cf. Hicks, p. 274 ad b9; also 403a31, 432b31.
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organs, however, it can be conceived to be especially present and
operating in a principal or controlling organ of the body, as is the
case for the heart in Aristotle's psychology.
Likewise, Descartes maintains clearly that
the soul is really joined to the whole body, and ... we cannot, properly
speaking, say that it exists in any one of its parts to the exclusion of
the others, because it is one and in some manner indivisible.
. . . fame est veritablement jointe a tout le corps, & ... on ne peut
pas proprement dire qu'elle soit en quelcune de ses parties, a I'exclusion
des autres, a cause qu'il est un, & en quelque fa^on indivisi-
ble .. . {Passions, Art. XXX; H-R I, 345; A-T XI, 351).
However, he also maintains:
It is likewise necessary to know that although the soul is joined to the
whole body, there is yet in that a certain part in which it exercises its
functions more particularly than in all the others. . . .
II est besoin aussi de sgavoir que, bien que I'ame soit jointe a tout le
corps, il y a neantmoins en luy quelque partie, en laquelle elle exerce
ses fonctions plus particulierement qu'en toutes les autres. {Passions,
Art. XXXI; H-R I, 345; A-T XI, 351-52)
That part is, of course, the pineal gland.
How do Aristotle and Descartes conceive the soul as operating
especially in or through this central organ? The process is, of course,
far too complex for detailed description here. However, the sensory-
motor mechanism in Descartes can be summarized broadly in his
own words as follows:
Let us then conceive here that the soul has its principal seat in the
little gland which exists in the middle of the brain, from whence it
radiates forth through all the remainder of the body by means of the
animal spirits, nerves, and even the blood. . . .
Concevons done icy que fame a son siege principal dans la petite
glande qui est au milieu du cerveau, d'ou elle rayonne en tout le reste
du corps par I'entremise des esprits, des nerfs, & mesme du sang. . . .
{Passions, Art. XXXIV; H-R I, 347; A-T XI, 354)
This gives us the general structure. He then provides for reflex
or instinctive reaction as follows:
And recollecting what has been said about the machine of our body,
i.e., that the little filaments of our nerves are so distributed in all its
parts that on the occasion of the diverse movements which are there
excited by sensible objects, they open in diverse ways the pores of the
brain, which causes the animal spirits contained in these cavities to
enter in diverse ways into the muscles. . . .
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Et nous souvenant de ce qui a este dit cy-dessus de la machine de
nostre corps, a sgavoir que les petits filets de nos nerfs sont tellement
distribuez en toutes se parties, qu'a I'occasion des divers mouvemens
qui y sont excitez par les objets sensibles, ils ouvrent diversement les
pores du cerveau, ce qui fait que les esprits animaux contenus en ses
cavitez entrent diversement dans les muscles. . . . {Pass. XXXIV; H-R
I, 347; A-T XI, 354)
Sense perceptions from external and internal stimuli are accounted
for thus:
... let us here add that the small gland which is the main seat of the
soul is so suspended between the cavities [of the brain] which contain •
the [animal] spirits that it can be moved by them in as many different
ways as there are sensible diversities in the object; but that it may
also be moved in diverse ways by the soul whose nature is such that
it receives in itself as many diverse impressions,— that is to say, that
it possesses as many diverse perceptions as there are diverse movements
in this gland.
Adjoustons icy que la petite glande qui est le principal siege de I'ame,
est tellement suspendue entre les cavitez qui contienent ces esprits,
qu'elle peut estre meue par eux en autant de diverses famous, qu'il y
a de diversitez sensibles dans les objets; mais qu'elle peut aussi estro»
diversement meue par I'ame, laquelle est de telle nature qu'elle recoit
autant de diverses impressions en elle, c'est a dire, qu'elle a autant de
diverses perceptions, qu'il arrive de divers mouvemens en cette glande.
(Pass. XXXIV; H-R I, 347; A-T XI, 254-55)
Motor responses are provided for as follows:
Reciprocally, likewise, the machine of the body is so formed that from
the simple fact that this gland is diversely moved by the soul ... it
thrusts the [animal] spirits which surround it towards the pores of the
brain, which conduct them by the nerves into the muscles, by which
means it causes them to move the limbs.
Comme aussi reciproquement la machine du corps est tellement
composee, que de cela seul que cette glande est diversement meue
par I'ame . . . elle pousse les esprits qui I'environnent vers les pores
du cerveau, qui les conduisent par les nerfs dans les muscles, au moyen
de quoy elle leur fait mouvoir les membres. {Pass. XXXIV; H-R I,
347; A-T XI, 355)
The process is that sense impulses, transmitted through the nerves,
are mediated by "animal spirits" to the pineal gland, where they
cause the conscious experience of sense perception in the soul.
Likewise, the soul can move the pineal gland, setting up movement
of the surrounding "animal spirits" which is thus transmitted to
nerves and muscles as motor impulses.
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In this the critical role of the pineal gland and what Descartes calls
"animal spirits" must be evident. He goes on to describe how the
visual perception of an object takes place through images in the optic
nerves ultimately transmitted by the animal spirits in the surrounding
brain cavities to the pineal gland which, he says, "acting immediately
upon the soul, causes it to see" ("agissant immediatement contre
I'ame, luy fait voir. . . ," Passions, Art. XXXV; H-R I, 347-48; A-T
XI, 356). Awareness of interior passion also,— fear, for example—
comes about by reaction of the animal spirits "to give movement to
the gland by which fear is placed in the soul" ("donner le mouvement
a la glande, par lequel la peur est mise dans I'ame . . . ," Passions, Art.
XXXVIII; H-R I, 349; A-T XI, 358).
Descartes conceives these animal spirits as "a certain very subtle
air or wind" (". . . un certain air ou vent tres-subtil, qu'on nomme
les esprits animaux . . . ," Passions, Art. VII; H-R I, 334; A-T XI,
332); and again, "material bodies of extreme minuteness. . . . they
move very quickly like the particles of the flame which issues from
a torch" (". . . ce sont des corps tres-petits, & qui se meuvent tres-
viste, ainsi que les parties de la flame qui sort d'un flambeau . . . ,"
Passiotis, Art. X; H-R I, 336; A-T XI, 335); elsewhere, "a very subtle
wind, or rather a flame which is very pure and very vivid" (". . . un
vent tres subtil, ou plutost comme une flame tres pure 8c tres vive . . . ,"
Discourse on Method V; H-R I, 115; A-T VI, 54). He explains that
animal spirits are the product of "the most animated and subtle
portions of the blood which the heat has rarefied in the heart"
(".
. . les plus vives & plus subtiles parties du sang, que la chaleur a
rarefiees dans le coeur. . .") and sent up to fill the cavities of the
brain {Passions, Art. X; H-R I, 335; A-T XI, 334). Incidentally,
Descartes, like Aristotle, considers the heart to be the center of vital
heat in the body. He says that
so long as we live there is a continual heat in our heart ... a species
of fire which the blood of the veins maintains, and . . . this fire is the
corporeal principle of all the movements of our members.
. . . pendant que nous vivons, il y a une chaleur continuelle en nostre
coeur, . . . une espece de feu que le sang des venes y entretient, & . . . ce
feu est le principe corporel de tous le mouvemens de nos membres.
{Passions, Art. VIII; H-R I, 335; A-T XI, 333)
Descartes' "animal spirits" reminds us immediately of the myste-
rious (TVn<t)VTov TTVivna— the "connate spirit" or "breath"— which is
for Aristotle the principal medium by which the soul present in the
heart is affected by sensory impulses and emotional reactions, and by
which it initiates external response. Like Descartes' "animal spirits,"
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the avn<i>VTov Tvevfia, as the term implies, is a kind of breath or air;
but warm air, involving an element of heat that is, as Aristotle says,
"analogous to the element of the stars" {avaXoyou ovcra to) tcop
a<TTpo)v oTOLX^io), De Gen. Animalium 736b38-737al), giving it special
capacities for the communication of life and vital functions {ibid.
736b30 ff.r
As Descartes' animal spirits surround the pineal gland, so Aristotle's
avn4>vTou TTvevixa operates within and around the heart especially,
which at one point he calls the "pneumatic member" (fTri to)
TTvev/xaTLKO) ixopio), De Gen. An. 781a31). The avyi(t)VTov Trvev/xa mediates
sensory impulses coming from the sense organ to the soul present in
the heart (e.g., De Gen. An. 781a21-33); and mediates motor impulses
from the soul in the heart to the joints and sinews. Aristotle says:
All animals both possess symphyton pneuma and derive their strength
from this. . . . This [pneuma] seems to bear a relation to the soul-as-
source similar to that which the point in the joints,— the one which
imparts movement and is itself moved— has to the unmoved. And
since the soul-source is . . . situated in the heart, it is clear that the
symphyton pneuma is also there" {De Motu An. 703a9-16 Nussbaum,
adapted).
iravra 81 <f)aiveTai tu foia koI (Xovtu Trvevfia (Tvn(f)VTOv koo. Cax^ovTa
TOVTW. . . . Tovro de irpoq tt) apxw ttiv ypvxt-KriP toiKtv op^ioiq ex^iv o)(nrtp to iv
Talc, Katiiralc, ar\peiov, to kivovv kou. uvovpevov, Trpbq to akivrjTov. eiret 6' i] apxv
Tolc, pev iv Ty Kapb'ux . . . 5ia tovto koI to irvevpa to avp4>VT0V ivTovda (jyaivtTai
Sv.
Thus in Aristotle the avpcjyvTov Trvevpa functions as immediate agent
of the life processes originating in the soul operating through the
heart. The details can be found summarized elsewhere.^ I only mean
to suggest here that there seems to be a close analogy between
Descartes' "animal spirits" and Aristotle's avpcpvTov irvivpa with
relation to the central organ (pineal gland or heart) through which
soul principally operates. Although Descartes' knowledge of anatomy
and physiology, especially that of the central nervous system, repre-
sents a considerable advance over Aristotle, when it comes to ex-
plaining the body-soul relationship he is still left with Aristotle's basic
model: soul operating in a central organ through the medium of a
^ M. Nussbaum, Aristotle's De Motu Animalium (Princeton 1978), p. 162: "We can
only say that pneuma is, apparently, air with a special kind of heat in it that makes it
behave unlike ordinary air, more like a different element."
' See A. L. Peck's De. Gen. An. in the Loeb Series (1953), Appendix B, 576-93;
F. Solmsen,/ of Hellenic Studies 77 (1957), 119-23; M. Nussbaum, 143-164 (Essay
3).
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special subtle kind of matter (a warm air). He sums up the process
as follows:
Hence in our very selves the mind [or soul] by no means moves the
external limbs immediately, but merely directs the subtle fluid, styled
the animal spirits, that passes from the heart through the brain toward
the muscles, and determines this fluid to perform definite motions,
these animal spirits being in their own nature capable of being utilized
with equal facility for many distinct actions.
. . . adeo ut nequidem in nobis ipsis mens immediate moveat membra
externa, sed dirigat tantum spiritus a corde per cerebrum in musculos
fluentes eosque ad certos motus determinet, cum ex se isti spiritus ad
multas actiones diversas aeque facile applicentur. {Reply to Objections
IV, H-R II, 103; A-T VII, 229)
Despite these superficial similarities in their psychology, however,
Descartes' view of soul differs radically from that of Aristotle. There
is little need to remind this audience of the implications of Aristotle's
hylomorphic view of soul and body as developed in the De Anima
especially, where the relationship is that of form to matter in consti-
tuting the living individual organism; where soul is ''the first actuation
{ivTeX(x^La) of a natural body furnished with organs" {evreXix^La i)
-KpiOTt] (TixiixaToc, (pvaLKov opyauLKov, De An. 412b5), and where all second
actuations (even some noetic) are adequately described only as events
of the body-soul compound, having both psychic and somatic aspects.
As Aristotle explains, when the person experiences anger,, tenderness,
fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, hating, even thought "... simulta-
neously with these the body is modified in some way" {oi^a yap
TovToiq Traaxei ri to a(cp.a, De An. 403a 18). The unity between body
and soul, matter and form, is as close in the living compound as that
of wax and the impression in the wax; the axe and axeness; the eye
and the power of sight {ibid. 412b6-413a3). A material eye without
sight is no more an eye than a corpse is a man {De Gen. An. 735a7-8;
and cf. 734b25-27, 726b23-25).'^ Body and soul are simply two
inseparable aspects of the living organism.
The same kind of unity exists, by implication, between the psychic
and somatic aspects of all second actuations as well. For Aristotle
maintains that it is as inadequate to describe the experience of anger
simply as "the desire for retaliation" (6 ixkv yap ope^Lv auTLXvirrjaeo^q,
its formal aspect) as it would be to describe it simply as "a boiling of
the blood around the heart" (6 de ^eciv tov irtpX Kapbiav aifiaToq, its
''
"No part of the body will be such in more than name unless it has some Soul
in it (e.g. the eye of a dead person)" {ovn nopiov earai ^lr) fifrixou [4^XV<i] otXk' tj
b^ujivvntjii;,, wairep redviwroc, oipdaXpcx;). A. L. Peck, De Gen. An. 735a7-8.
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But Aristotle goes beyond this, as you recall, to describe the soul,
once implanted and joined to appropriate matter, also as efficient cause
in the development and maintenance of organs and life functions in
the individual. The De Generatione Animalium details the process by
which the implanted soul forms the heart first, and thereafter the
rest of the organs as outgrowths and extensions from the heart
(742a 16 ff.). The De Anima generalizes on this:
Moreover, the soul is also the origin of motion from place to
place. . . . Qualitative change also, and growth are due to soul. For
sensation is supposed to be a sort of qualitative change. . . . The same
holds of growth and decay. ...
aXKa nfjv Koi ddev irpCyrov i] Kara rbirov Kivrjcnq, ^I'VXV- • • ecTi de kol aXKoiuiaiq
Koi av^rjaiq Kara ypvxw- v fiev yap ataOijaic, aXKomaiq tk; uvai boKtl. . . .
onoiuic, 8e Kot TTcpt ocv^ifaewq re Koi (f>diaiU3q Ixti. {De An. 415b21-26)
In the De Anima and elsewhere Aristotle describes both psychic
and somatic aspects of the nutritive, sentient, movent, and desiderative
functions in man. But when he comes to grips with the problem of
man's highest function, the intellectual, his hylomorphic account
breaks down,— at least to the extent that one so-called "part" of the
soul, the intellect {vovq: the power of comprehending non-material
reality), is denied a specific bodily organ:
If the entire soul holds together the whole body, then each of its
"parts" ought properly to hold together some part of the body. But
this seems impossible. For it is difficult to conjecture what part the
intellect will hold together or how it can hold any part together.
a yap rj Skt] ypvxn i^btv to aobfia avvexei, irpoariKei koi tu}v piopioiv tKaarov
avv'tx^LV Ti Tov aConaroq. tovto 5' eoiKev advvaTU}- iroiov yap nbpiov rf -KUiq b
vovq avvi^H, xoi^^TTov Kal irXaaaL. {De An. 4 11 bl 5- 18)
When he comes to analyze the intellectual function closely, however
{De An. 429a 10 ff.), Aristotle distinguishes two "parts" of intellect:
(1) the receptive intellect, the potentiality for receiving the intelligible
forms transmitted in the phantasms, and (2) the activating or agent
intellect, which actuates this potency "as light brings out the colors
present in a darkened room" {tpottov yap Tiva koL to ^ox; ttouX to.
hvva.n€L ovra xP^I-*^<XTa evepyeia xP<J^I^<^TOi> De An. 430a 15- 17). The
receptive intellect is apparently closely involved with those faculties
of soul that inform and operate through a material organ, namely,
the central sense power, ^ai/raata, and memory, operating in the
heart. The agent intellect alone seems to actuate no material organ,
which implies for Aristotle that it actuates itself as pure form or act.
Consequently it is capable of separate existence, for any "part" of
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heart. The agent intellect alone seems to actuate no material organ,
which implies for Aristotle that it actuates itself as pure form or act.
Consequently it is capable of separate existence, for any "part" of
soul not actuating material body is separable (De An. 413a3-6).
Aristotle must have this aspect of vovq in mind when he says:
It would seem to be a distinct species of soul, alone capable of separate
existence, something eternal (aidiov), as it were, distinct from the
perishable.
a\X' (OLKe \pvxv<i y^voc, erepov eivm, Koi tovto nbvov ivSex^adai X'*'Ptf«o'^«i.
Kadairep to oilbiov tov (t>6apT0v. {De An. 413b25-27)
If this "part" of the intellectual soul is eternal, it must have
preexisted before the individual human organism was conceived.
Aristotle seems to have accepted this consequence, but is vague about
the manner of its joining the compound, explaining that while the
nutritive and sentient "souls" with potentiality for the rational are
supplied by the parents,
the nous alone enters, in addition, from outside and is alone divine;
for bodily activity has no share in its activity.
XeiireraL dfi tov vovv hovov dvpadiv eTreiauvai Koi detov eivai nbvov. ovdev yap
ocvTOV Ty ivepyeia KOivoivd aoinaTiKT} ivepyeia. {De Gen. An. 736b27-29)
Likewise, since this activating povq is eternal, it must survive the
dissolution of the compound at death.
But nous seems to be engendered in us as a self-existing substance,
and to be imperishable.
6 5e vovc, wiKtv iyyiveadm ovaia tic, ovaa, koi ov (t>9€ip€adai. {De An.
408b 18- 19)
Hence Aristotle does affirm the immortality of this part of soul. But
this seems in no way to constitute personal immortality. For Aristotle
asserts that
reasoning, love, and hatred are not attributes of the nous but of its
individual possessor. . . . Hence, when this possessor perishes, there is
neither memory or love; for these never did belong to the nous but
to the composite whole which has perished; while the nous is doubtless
a thing more divine and impassive.
TO 5i biavodadm Koi (fnXetu rj fuaeiv om tOTw iKOVov [vov\ iradri, aWa tovSI
TOV exovToq Ikhvo. . . .bio Kcii tovtov (f>daponevov ovt( p.VT]px)v(va oirre (JkXh-
ov yap (Kfivov rju, aXXa tov kolvov, o airbXuXev. b bi vovc, ixrox, daintpov n Koi
airaSeq eaTLv. {De An. 408b25-29)
Even the receptive nous perishes with memory:
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. . . TOVTO nbvop ccdavaTov kcu ciihov {ov nvrjuovtvonep 8e, 5ti. tovto fiev
airade;, b be iraOriTiKoq povq <f>6apTb(;y koi avev tovtov ovdep poet. {ibid.
430a23-25)
The surviving soul is pure act, independent of matter and self-
existent, without memory of previous existence, without acquired
knowledge or modification of any sort (airadeq) resulting from its
operation in the living individual. This is hardly personal immortality.
On the other hand, one of the propositions that Descartes considers
most important to establish is precisely the proposition that the
personal soul is immortal. His Discourse on the Method indicates that
his whole discussion of the human soul is linked with the problem of
its origin and destiny. He claims to have shown that the rational soul
"could not be in any way derived from the power of matter. . . but
that it must be expressly created" (". . . ne peut aucunement estre
tiree de la puissance de la matiere, . . . mais qu'elle doit expressement
estre creee" . . . , Disc. V; H-R I, 118; A-T VI, 59-60). And again,
"that our soul is in its nature entirely independent of body, and in
consequence that it is not liable to die with it" (". . . la nostre [ame]
est d'une nature entierement independante du cors, & par consequent,
qu'elle n'est point suiette a mourir avec luy. . . , Disc. V, end; H-R I,
118; A-T VI, 59-60; cf. dedication to the Meditations, H-R I, 333*34;
Med. II).
Descartes begins his search for truth, as you recall, not with
Aristotle's attempt at objective analysis of the external universe, of
living beings, and of man in the total scheme of things, but modo
geometrico, with a clear, distinct, and undeniable proposition drawn
from inner experience: cogito; ergo sum— "I am thinking; therefore I
exist." In the Discourse on the Method (Pt. IV) he reasons that it is
inconceivable that he, the "thinking thing," does not exist. But, he
continues,
I saw that I could conceive (1) that I had no body, and (2) that there
was no world nor place where I might be. . . . From that I knew that
I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think; and
that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend
on any material thing; so that this "me," that is to say, the soul by
which I am what I am, is entirely distinctfrom body, and even more easy
to know than the latter; and even if body were not, the soul would not
cease to be what it is. . . .
. . . voyant que je pouvois feindre que je n'avois aucun cors, 8c qu'il
n'y avoit aucun monde, ny aucun lieu ou je fusse . . . je connu de la
que j'estois une substance dont toute I'essence ou la nature n'est que
de penser, & qui, pour estre, n'a besoin d'aucun lieu, ny ne depend
d'aucune chose materielle. En sorte que ce Moy, c'est a dire, I'Ame
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par laquelle je suis ce que je suis, est entierement distincte du cors,
& mesme qu'elle est plus aisee a connoistre que luy, 8c qu'encore qu'il
ne fust point, elle ne lairroit pas d'estre tout ce qu'elle est. {Disc. IV;
H-R I, 101; A-T VI, 32-33)
There we have the essence of the Cartesian logico-introspective
method; his identification of the thinking subject with the soul; and
the basic reason for soul's complete independence of body and
consequent immortality.
The same line of reasoning is found in Meditations VI:
And although ... I possess a body with which I am intimately con-
joined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear and distinct idea
of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and unextended thing,
and as, on the other, I possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it
is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that this I is
entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without
it.
Et quamvis . . . habeam corpus, quod mihi valde arete conjunctum est,
quia tamen ex una parte claram & distinctam habeo ideam mei ipsius,
quatenus sum tantum res cogitans, non extensa, & ex alia parte
distinctam ideam corporis, quatenus est tantum res extensa, non
cogitans, certum est me a corpore meo revera esse distinctum, &
absque illo posse existere. {Med. VI; H-R I, 190; A-T VII, 78)
Soul, then, is for Descartes the "thinking thing" {res cogitans) with
which I, the person, am identified. It is a substance, "a thinking and
unextended thing . . . entirely and absolutely distinct from my body,"
which is another substance, "an extended and unthinking thing," as
he describes them. The consequence is for him that this "I," that is,
my soul, since it is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, can
exist without it. The same reasoning in extended form appears in
Meditations II (H-R I, 149-151).
Descartes identifies soul also as "mind," or "understanding" or
"reason" ("sum igitur praecise tantum res cogitans, id est, mens, sive
animus, sive intellectus, sive ratio . . . ," Med. II; H-R I, 152; A-T
VII, 27). And "thinking" includes for him a range of psychic events
far beyond what Aristotle would classify as functions of the rational
soul, i.e., as "thought." "What is a thing that thinks?" he asks. "It is
a thing which doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills,
refuses, which also imagines and feels."
Res cogitans. Quid est hoc? Nempe dubitans, intelligens, affirmans,
negans, volens, nolens, imaginans quoque, &: sentiens. {Med. II; H-R
I, 153; A-T VII, 28)
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In his Principles of Philosophy Descartes summarizes his position on
what thought (cogitatio) is:
By the word Thought I understand all that of which we are conscious
as operating in us. And that is why not alone understanding, willing,
imagining, but also feeling, are here the same as thought. For if I say
I see, or I walk, I therefore am, and if by seeing and walking I mean
the action of my eyes or my legs, which is the work of my body, my
conclusion is not absolutely certain; because it may be that, as often
happens in dreams, I think I see or walk, although I never open my
eyes or move from my place. . . . But if I mean only to talk of my
sensation (sensu) or my consciously seeming to see or to walk, it becomes
quite true, because my assertion now refers only to my mind, which
alone is concerned with my feeling or thinking that I see and I walk.
Cogitationis nomine, intelligo ilia omnia, quae nobis consciis in nobis
hunt, quatenus eorum in nobis conscientia est. Atque ita non modo
intelligere, velle, imaginari, sed etiam sentire, idem est hic quod
cogitare. Nam si dicam, ego video, vel ego ambulo, ergo sum; & hoc
intelligam de visione, aut ambulatione, quae corpore peragitur, con-
clusio non est absolute certa; quia, ut saepe fit in somnis, possum
putare me videre, vel ambulare, quamvis oculos non aperiam, & loco
non movear. . . . Sed si intelligam de ipso sensu sive conscientia videndi
aut ambulandi, quia tunc refertur ad mentem, quae sola sentit si^e
cogitat se videre aut ambulare, est plane certa. {Princ. Part I, IX;
H-R I, 222; A-T VIII, 7-8)
Descartes considers all the data of consciousness, then, as "thought"
belonging to the soul, assuring the conscious subject of his existence.
What of the body? And the external world? Descartes is assured of
their existence only through the veracity of God, the Creator, whose
existence is known with a certainty second only to that of his own
existence. For Descartes discovers within his consciousness the "idea
of a Being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and absolutely perfect"
(".
. . unam [ideam] esse entis summe intelligentis, summe potentis
& summe perfecti . . .", Princ. Part I, XIV; H-R I, 224; A-T VIII,
10). And from the fact that his mind "perceives that necessary and
eternal existence is comprised in the idea which it has of an absolutely
perfect Being, it has clearly to conclude that this absolutely perfect
Being exists" (". . . ita ex eo solo quod percipiat existentiam neces-
sariam & aeternam in entis summe perfecti idea contineri, plane
concludere debet ens summe perfectum existere," Princ. Pt. I, XIV;
H-R, I, 225; A-T VIII, 10). Now the first of the Creator's attributes
is that He is "absolutely true and the source of all light, so that it is
evidently a contradiction that He should deceive us" (". . . summe
verax, &: dator omnis luminis: adeo ut plane repugnet ut nos fal-
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lat . . . ," Princ. Pt. I, XXIX; H-R I, 231; A-T VIII, 16). Hence it
follows that "the faculty of knowledge which God has given us can
never disclose to us any object which is not true, inasmuch as it
comprehends it . . . clearly and distinctly" ("Atque hinc sequi-
tur . . . cognoscendi facultatem a Deo nobis datam, nullum unquam
objectum posse attingere, quod non sit verum, quatenus ab ipsa
attingitur, hoc est, quatenus clare 8c distincte percipitur," Princ. Pt. I,
XXX; H-R I, 231; A-T VIII, 16). Again, "because God is no deceiver,
the faculty of knowledge that He has given us cannot be fallacious"
in assenting "to things that we clearly perceive" (". . . cum Deus non
sit fallax, facultas percipiendi quam nobis dedit, non potest tendere
in falsum . . . cum tantum ad ea quae clare percipiuntur se extendit,"
Princ. Pt. I, XLIII; H-R I, 236; A-T VIII, 21). What are some of
these things "we clearly perceive"? Descartes replies: "Of this nature
are mathematical demonstrations, the knowledge that material things
exist, and the evidence of all clear reasoning . . . about them" ("Tales
sunt Mathematicae demonstrationes; talis est cognitio quod res ma-
teriales exsistant; 8c talia sunt evidentia omnia ratiocinia, quae de
ipsis hunt," Princ. Pt. IV, CCVI; H-R I, 302; A-T VIII, 328). (This
is obviously a world apart from what has been called Aristotle's
"naive realism.")
Descartes asserts the existence of only two created substances^
{Princ. Pt. I, XLVIII; H-R I, 238; A-T VIII, 23): ". . . the one is
intellectual things . . . pertaining to the mind or to thinking substance;
the other is material things, or that pertaining to extended substance,
i.e., to body" (". . . unum est rerum intellectualium ... ad mentem
sive ad substantiam cogitantem pertinentium; aliud rerum materi-
alium, sive quae pertinent ad substantiam extensam, hoc est, ad
corpus"); for we have "two clear and distinct ideas, the one of created
substance that thinks, the other of corporeal substance" (". . .
possumus duas claras & distinctas habere notiones, sive ideas, unum
substantiae cogitantis creatae, aliam substantiae corporeae . . . ^ Princ.
Pt. I, LIV; H-R I, 241; A-T VIII, 25). Each has its principal attribute:
".
. . extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the nature
of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of thinking
substance" ("Nempe extensio in longum, latum & profundum, sub-
stantiae corporeae naturam constituit; 8c cogitatio constituit naturam
substantiae cogitantis," Princ. Pt. I, LIII; H-R I, 240; A-T VIII, 25).
' "By substance we can understand nothing else than a thing which so exists that
it needs no other thing in order to exist" ("Per substantiam nihil aHud intelligere
possumus, quam rem quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum," Princ .
Pt. I. LI, H-R I, 239; A-T VIII, 24). Descartes clearly understands that this definition
cannot be applied univocally to God and created substances.
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Functions of the soul, of the body, and of the compound are
described thus {Princ. Pt. I, XLVIII; H-R I, 238; A-T VIII, 23):
Perception, volition, and every mode of knowing and willing pertain
to thinking substance; while to extended substance pertain magnitude,
or extension in length, breadth, and depth, figure, movement, situa-
tion, divisibility into parts themselves divisible, and such. Besides these
there are, however, certain things we experience . . . which should be
attributed neither to mind nor body alone but to the close and intimate
union that exists between the body and mind. . . . Such are the
appetites of hunger, thirst, etc., and also the emotions or passions of
the mind which do not subsist in mind or thought alone, as the
emotions of anger, joy, sadness, love, etc.; and finally all the sensations
"
such as pain, pleasure, light and color, sounds, odors, tastes, heat,
hardness, and all other tactile qualities.
Perceptio, volitio, omnesque modi tam percipiendi quam volendi, ad
substantiam cogitantem referuntur; ad extensam autem, magnitudo,
sive ipsamet extensio in longum, latum 8c profundum, figura, motus,
situs, partium ipsarum divisibilitas, & talia. Sed & alia quaedam in
nobis experimur, quae nee ad solam mentem, nee etiam ad solum
corpus referri debent, quaeque . . . ab arcta & intima mentis nostrae
cum corpore unione proficiscuntur; nempe appetitus famis, sitis, &:c.;
itemque, commotiones, sive animi pathemata, quae non in sola cogl-
tatione consistunt, ut commotio ad iram, ad hilaritatem, ad tristitiam,
ad amorem, &c.; ac denique sensus omnes, ut doloris, titillationis, lucis
& colorum, sonorum, odorum, saporum, caloris, duritiei, aliarumque
tactilium qualitatum.
We have already seen the broad outline of Descartes' physiological
psychology by which soul and body were described as interacting
through the nervous system, the animal spirits, and the pineal gland,
the "principal seat" of the soul, where soul receives and reacts to
material impulses from inside and outside the organism, and sets up
physical changes relayed to the muscles that control bodily motion.
What we now appreciate, however, is that soul and body are conceived
basically as two completely distinct and independent substances which
somehow join to cooperate in this manner.
The body is, in fact, conceived by Descartes as a machine, created
in such a way that it could exist independently of soul, operating by
purely mechanical principles, principally through the vital heat cen-
tered in the heart. Descartes considered all material substances, even
heat, to be composed of minute bodies or corpuscles having only
those attributes he mentions,— extension in length, breadth, depth,
figure or shape, movement, situation, and divisibility. The sole type
of change or motion is mechanical— by impact or collision of particles,
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by pushing or pulling in larger structures. Descartes compares the
body specifically to "a watch or other automaton (i.e., a machine that
moves itself)" which is "wound up and contains in itself the corporeal
principle of those movements for which it is designed along with all
that is requisite for its action" (". . . une montre, ou autre automate
(c'est a dire, autre machine qui se meut de soy-mesme) ... est montee,
& ... a en soy le principe corporel des mouvemens pour lesquels elle
est instituee, avec tout ce que est requis pour son action . . . ," Passions
of the Soul Pt. I, Art. VI; H-R I, 333; A-T XI, 331). Unlike Aristotle,
Descartes does not consider soul to be cause of the ordinary life-
processes of the body "since they do not depend on thought at all"
(".
. . en tant qu'ils ne dependent point de la pensee . . . ," Pass., Pt.
I, Art. IV; H-R I, 332; A-T XI, 329).
... I consider the body of a man as being a sort of machine so built
up and composed of nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin that though
there were no mind in it at all, it would not cease to have the same
motions as at present, exception being made of those movements
which are due to the direction of the will, and in consequence depend
upon the mind. . . .
... si considerem hominis corpus, quatenus machinamentum quod-
dam est ex ossibus, nervis, musculis, venis, sanguine & pellibus ita
aptum & compositum, ut, etiamsi nulla in eo mens existeret, eosdem
tamen haberet omnes motus qui nunc in eo non ab imperio voluntatis
nee proinde a mente procedunt. . . . (Meditations VI; H-R I, 195; A-T
VII, 84)
Death of the body is not caused by departure of the soul; rather, the
soul departs because the body breaks down, as "a watch or other
machine when it is broken and when the principle of its movement
ceases to act" (". . . montre, ou autre machine, lors qu'elle est rompue
& que le principe de son mouvement cesse d'agir," Passions Art. VI;
H-R I, 333; A-T XI, 331).
Soul and body chiefly interact, as we have seen, through the pineal
gland, which Descartes specifies as "the portion of the brain by which
the mind is immediately affected" (". . . in ea parte cerebri quae
immediate mentem afficit . . . ," Med. VI; H-R I, 197; A-T VII, 87);
it receives the mechanical reactions of the body and itself acts, in
Descartes words, "immediately upon the soul" (". . . immediatement
contre I'ame . . . ," Passions, Art. XXXV; H-R I, 348; A-T XI, 356).
Of pain perception he says ". . . the movement [of the nerves]
passing ... to the inmost parts of the brain, gives a sign to the mind,
which makes it feel somewhat, to wit, pain" (". . . ille eorum
motus ... ad intima cerebri pertingens, ibi menti signum dat ad
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passing ... to the inmost parts of the brain, gives a sign to the mind,
which makes it feel somewhat, to wit, pain" (". . . ille eorum
motus ... ad intima cerebri pertingens, ibi menti signum dat ad
aliquid sentiendum, nempe dolorem . . . ," Med. VI, H-R I, 197;
A-T VII, 88). Conversely, he says that when the soul "desires
something, it causes the little gland to which it is closely united to
move in the way requisite ..." (". . . veut quelque chose, elle fait
que la petite glande, a qui elle est estroitement jointe, se meut en la
fagon qui est requise . . . ," Passions, Art. XLI; H-R I, 350; A-T XI,
360).
But how does Descartes conceive these two separate and distinct
substances to be "closely united"? As far as I know, his best response
is contained in Meditation VI where he declares that nature, through
the sensations of pain, hunger, and thirst, teaches
that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that
I am closely united with it, and, so to speak, so intermingled with it
that I seem to compose with it one whole . . . these sensations of
hunger, thirst, pain, etc. are in truth none other than certain confused
modes of thought which are produced by the union and apparent
intermingling of mind and body.
. . . me non tantum adesse meo corpori ut nauta adest navigio, sed
illi arctissime esse conjunctum & quasi permixtum, adeo ut unum quid
cum illo componam. . . . Nam certe isti sensus sitis, famis, doloris, &:c.,
nihil aliud sunt quam confusi quidam cogitandi modi ab unione &
quasi permixtione mentis cum corpore exorti. {Med. VI; H-R I, 192;
A-T VII, 81)
"Intermingling" can be easily understood of two different material
substances; but what does it mean when applied to the union of a
material with a completely non-material substance, one incapable of
physical contact or location in place? When one of his critics (Arnauld)
accuses Descartes of conceiving man as "a spirit that makes use of a
body" (". . . animum utentem corpore. . . ," Objections IV; H-R II,
84; A-T VII, 203), Descartes claims that his argument from the
consciousness of pain, hunger, and thirst have "proved that mind was
substantially united with the body" ("Nam in eadem sexta Medita-
tione, in qua egi de distinctione mentis a corpore, simul etiam probavi
substantialiter illi esse unitam . . . ," Reply to Objections IV; H-R II,
102; A-T VII, 227-28). Though he uses the expression "substantial
union" of mind and body, it cannot be understood in the Aristotelian
sense of form and matter uniting to constitute a single substance,
since Descartes has rejected the notion of substantial form. Another
critic (Gassendi) continues to press him on the point. "For there is
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sine partibus commiscibilibus utrique. . . . Quaenam vero corporeae
cum incorporea intelligi potest?" Objections V: H-R II, 201; A-T VII,
344). Descartes replies testily: "At no place do you bring an objection
to my arguments; you only set forth the doubts you think follow
from my conclusions" ("Nihil ullibi in meas rationes objicis, sed
tantum dubia proponis, quae tibi ex meis conclusionibus sequi viden-
tur," Reply to Obj. V; H-R II, 232; A-T VII, 389-90). Finally, when
his friend Princess Elizabeth asks the same questions,—how a thinking
soul could move the animal spirits— Descartes can only answer: "I
may truly say that what your Highness proposes seems to me to be
the question people have most right to ask me in view of my published
works" ("Et je puis dire, avec verite, que la question que votre Altesse
propose, me semble estre celle qu'on me peut demander avec le plus
de raison, en suite des escrits que j'ay publiez," A-T III, 663; A.
Kenny, Descartes, 1968, p. 226).
There we have it, then. Two models of human nature, soul and
body,— Aristotle's hylomorphism and Descartes' dualism. Each has
its problems: If body and soul are united as matter and form, how
do we account for the soul's apparent power to transcend matter in
conceiving the non-material, the universal? How satisfy man's almost
universal longing for personal survival after death? On the other
hand, if soul is a thinking substance entirely independent of matter,
and body a mere machine of well-coordinated material parts, how
can they possibly be united and interact in a single composite
organism? We can, of course, go a step further, as did La Mettrie a
century after Descartes, and discard the notion of soul altogether,
settling for the bleak view that all living beings, including man, are
merely quasi-machines. But that view also has its problems. Perhaps
most important is that we continue to search, to think about the
problem of body and soul. Or at least that we continue to think. For,
as Descartes points out in the second Meditation (H-R I, 151; A-T
VII, 27), "it might possibly be the case that— if I ceased entirely to
think— I should likewise cease altogether to exist" (". . . nam forte
etiam fieri posset, si cessarem ab omni cogitatione, ut illico totus esse
desinerem").
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